PUNTLAND DEMOCRATIZATION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

The article first appeared at  Wardheernews on March 31,2021

Why Puntland's First Democratization Experiment Failed?

Puntland state was established in August 1998 as an autonomous region of Somalia. The first charter adopted to transition the administration from a clan-based system to multiparty democracy in three years never materialized. The administration at the time did not strive, though nascent, to put in place the necessary infrastructure to hold elections due to, as they put it, enormous security and economic challenges. And there was limited time to democratize Puntland. Finally, the president of the time strived for the parliament to extend his tenure, leading to constitutional crises culminating in a full-blown war.

In the intervening administrations, Abdirahman Farole's government took the first initial step towards democratization. It completed the draft constitution ratified by the constituent assembly in April 2012. The adopted constitution paved the way for multiparty system modalities such as drafting key electoral laws and establishing the transitional electoral commission. The commission was made up of nine members; five were appointed by the president and four by the parliament, and the parliament passed local election law in September 2012. In April 2013, the parliament made amendments removing voter registration and ID from the law. The new amendment caused controversy; subsequently, two political associations boycotted the election. The parliament has passed the political association law in June 2012; hence TPEC registered six political associations in March 2013. The local council election slated to take place in July 2013 was cancelled due to the eruption of violence in Qardho and Galkayo, as the elders and politicians alike had been all along calling for the government to stop the election all but unheeded.

There were several attributed reasons that caused the failure of the first experiment to democratize. At the beginning of the process, there was suspicion on the part of the public about the government's motive since it started the program merely a year before the end of its term. The process was hasty, and the government failed to conduct a public consultation with key stakeholders, including politicians, youth, women, and traditional elders who wield significant power in the state. Obviously, the timeframe to conduct wide-ranging civic and voter education was limited. Most of the people in Puntland are young adults who have never exercised their voting rights. In that respect, the administration's respective agencies for the election failed to put in place modalities, such as the process of casting a vote and their rights and responsibilities as a voter, for them to do so.

The political associations raised concerns about the Neutrality of the TPEC, who failed to, as aforesaid, listen and take to account the concerns and suggestions of the political associations and the public as well. It was perceived as part and parcel of the government and Horsed party. The situation was aggravated by the resignation of two commission members due to impartiality with reference to the commission.

Rumours had it other surreptitiously camouflaged as genuine associations were created and bankrolled by the government to stave off the challenge posed by the in-contention opposition associations. The cancellation of voter registration was one of the reasons the political associations mistrusted the process and saw it as a plot to dishonestly arrange the result of the election before it happened. The political associations wrote a letter to the donors raising their concern about the cancellation of voter registration and stated that they wouldn't contest unless the voter registration was reinstated. There was a lack of dispute resolution mechanisms in place to handle election disputes.

Furthermore, the government failed to establish a constitutional court, which was one of the reasons the political associations mistrusted the fairness of the election process since there was no way to seek redress. Neither was there an alternative dispute resolution model to handle the election process. The oppositions argued freedom of expression and assembly are sin quo none to a free and fair election. The government restricted the media from broadcasting dissenting voices. Also, some of the media outlets that are suspected of being favourable to the opposing associations had been shut down all together. The final nail of the coffin had been the banning of assembly, which had consigned Puntland's first democratization experiment into the penumbra.

Will Said Deni's government achieve the second experiment to implement the multiparty system?

Even though Abdiwali Gaas appointed the TPEC two years before the end of his term, he has not, just like his predecessors, established the democratization process in the land and, ultimately, for the citizens to elect their leaders. The late appointment of the commission was the major cause of the failure as the time had not been sufficient enough. Nevertheless, the public was sceptical and suspicious about the process. The donors were also not ready to fund the process due to the delay in nominating the Transitional electoral commission.

President Said Abdullahi was the incumbent who nominated the electoral commission in the first year of his administration. This presaged to the public that the government, this time round, is serious about implementing a democratization system in Puntland. As per the TPEC annual report, it has achieved some milestones that will pave the way for holding one person, one, vote election in Puntland for the first time in its existence. The TPEC registered and certified 10 political associations that met the requirement. It reviewed some electoral laws and was passed by the parliament; recruited key staff for HQ and that of districts earmarked as a litmus test before rolling it out throughout Puntland regions; put in place the legal frameworks regarding the multiparty system modes, and setting out the tender for procurement of biometric registration system.

The voter registration for early election in Eyl, Ufeyn and Qardho was slated to be conducted between 16- 29 may 2021, while concomitantly, the parliament enacted the voter education law. Finally, the members of electoral dispute resolution were appointed by the commission.

Challenges

Even though the commission has achieved key milestones, there are considerable challenges that might hinder the process, of whom the commission's dependency on an unpredictable donor, without which hampers the delivery of electoral activities, stands tall. The Puntland contribution to the commission is minuscule and barely covers the operational cost of the offices. There is limited awareness on the part of the public on how the multiparty system works, as the successive administrations didn't prepare, as far as their rights and responsibilities is concerned, for the citizens to take part in civic life. The weapons in the hands of the public might create an unconducive environment and cause violence and unrest if certain constituents/sub-clans felt injustice for some voting irregularities/suppression, certain constituents/sub-clans felt injustice.

Equally important, the traditional elders who wield significant power could pose a challenge to democratization, as they might perceive the process of migrating from a clan-based system to a multiparty system, will render them un-influential and confine them in the traditional agnate contractual principles.

Certainly, media freedom has been curtailed during the tenure of Said Deni, as several reporters were arrested for broadcasting unpleasant news for his administration. In that regard, as democracy needs to operate in a free environment, the administration should restrain itself and let the mass media operate freely in covering the election.

It's also unclear how the commission will hold elections in districts controlled by Somaliland and what modalities representatives, given their constituents are under hostile administration, from these districts will be elected. Essential pillars, such as the constitutional court, to solve the election disputes and the demarcations of the districts, have not been established yet. Finally, the covid-19 pandemic is the biggest challenge and may hamper the whole process. 

Recommendations

• The commission should conduct a wider civic education in all cities before the election to inform citizens of their rights and responsibilities.
• They should also work to build the confidence and trust of the people to the election process.
• They also must engage with key stakeholders and listen to their thoughts and concerns regarding the process.
• The traditional elders who wield significant power should also be meaningfully engaged in the process.
• The Puntland resource is insufficient to support the election; therefore, the International community should strive to provide technical and financial support to the commission.
• The government should hasten the establishment of the constitutional court to ascertain that, this time round, it's a series about the process of democratization, which in turn lifts the confidence of the political associations. 
• The Ministry of Interior should also expedite the demarcation of districts. 
• The government should also formulate a plan to disarm the clans ahead of the election.
• The multiparty system is long overdue in Puntland, and the current administration must, at all cost, seize the opportunity and implement it.

SAFIRKA: AN AMERICAN ENVOY: A BOOK REVIEW

Book: Safiirka
Author: Peter Bridges
Publisher:  Kent State University Press
Pages: 266
Language: English
Publication date‏: ‎2000

Peter Bridges is an American career diplomat who has served in American foreign service for three decades. He was posted in Panama, Russia, Czechoslovakia, and Italy before being appointed ambassador to Somalia in the mid-eighties.  In his memoir Safirka: An American envoy, he mainly talks about his tenure in Somalia from 1984-1986. He portrays Somalia as a country with poor, sunny, and proud people and, more importantly, with a begging bowl with an insatiable, greedy and ruthless dictator at the helm. He was appointed to manage America’s largest Aid in sub-Saharan Africa, amounting to 120 millions of military and civilian Aid, which was a large amount of money at the time.

The ambassador’s time coincides with a renewal of American interest in the turbulent but strategic Horn of Africa. With the peak of the Cold War and the Ogaden War fiasco, the US government was determined to sway Somalia from the Soviet orbit. A deal was reached between the two governments that the US would have access to military and naval facilities in Somalia in return for military and economic Aid. As per the Reagan Administration National Security Decision Directive of 1982, “The Horn of Africa is important to the United States primarily because of its strategic location with respect to the Persian Gulf/Southwest Asia region.” However, Peter believed Somali’s strategic importance was overrated and not as important as Washington said. Even before he was appointed as Ambassador, Peter’s attitude towards Somalia was overly negative, and he may have harbored racism towards Somalis. After all, he was a Southerner and whites who hail from that part of the United States are known for their hostilities towards black people.

Peter provides a glimpse of the general atmosphere of repression and fear that permeated in Somalia at the time. He delineated what it was like to serve as Ambassador under a totalitarian regime deftly exploiting the cold war rivalry between the Western democracies and communist countries. The ambassador narrated his first encounter with the late dictator. When he  finally met, Siad Barre warned him not to listen to traitors, and if he (the ambassador) wanted facts about the country, he should come to him directly any time. He even played a duplicitous game with him when he ordered his soldiers not to allow Somali invitees to a banquet thrown by the US Embassy for Somali students who graduated from American Universities. He later apologized to the ambassador and told him that it was his subordinates who acted without his permission. The deceit and trickery were his modus operandi with his dealing with both Somalis and foreigners for 21 years of his misrule.

Former President Barre

A recurring theme throughout the book is the Aid West Poured to Somalia and how the military regime mismanaged and misappropriated it. He describes how the Somali officials from Siad Barre to the lowest ranking officials were demanding more Aid to be provided to Somalia. He portrayed them as hungry wolves who clamored for more alms to devour without a hint of shame or irony.

A British Ambassador to Somalia and Arabist recommended Peter to read “The First Footsteps in East Africa” by Richard Burton. In the book, Mr. Burton said that Arabs called Somalia Bilaad Wax Isii(The land of give me something ).

Somali was receiving a large amount of humanitarian, development and military Aid during the ambassador’s stay in Somalia. But Peter did not see any meaningful impact on the ordinary citizens since the Somali Government’s officials were embezzling the aid. Most of the Aid was intended for the refugees from the Ogaden, whose number the regime inflated, but when he visited the camps, he was not convinced of the Somali government’s figure.

Amb Peter observed most development projects did crumble after a few years of completion due to a lack of maintenance by the Somali officials. If the projects were to succeed, he argued, they must be run by foreigners for many years. Basically, Somali officials were irresponsible, incompetent and had no regard for the future wellbeing of their country.

He tells how the Somali government was creating unnecessary fear that Ethiopia was invading Somalia in order to elicit more Military support from friendly foreign countries.

Amb Peter was astounded how “The Land of Give Me Something” even wanted to get Aid from the Catholics Church without allowing it to proselytize. The ambassador says the greed of Somali officials had known no limits. He said they would have done anything to squeeze a few dollars from anybody that is willing to spare some changes. One of their schemes to get more was come up by the country’s vice president General Samatar when he suggested establishing a diplomatic relationship with the Vatican through a former white house official.

The desperation for money even prompted Siad Barre to mend fences with Libya —the arch enemy of America —to get Aid from them and to stop their support to Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF).” Somalia’s approaches to South Africa, Libya and the Soviet Union might reflect venality of Siad Barre and his foster brother (Abdirahman Jama Barre), “he notes

He describes how shamelessly Somalia organized an International Conference on Drought Emergency, despite the rain beginning to pour. The donors advised against organizing the conference and warned the Somali officials not to embarrass their country. Still, they went ahead, and to their utter disappointment, no additional pledge was made by the donors. A delegation from Italy who traveled to Beldweyne to assess the drought situation couldn’t land because constant rains had flooded the runway.

He recalls a time he was stunned and angered when he was informed the clothes 21 October marchers wearing (one day use) had taken a government factory to produce them for many months while Siad Barre had constantly been imploring him to supply uniforms for his army, telling him they “were half naked and he had no money to buy anything, and his friends didn’t want to help.”

Amb Peter recognizes that the IMF structural adjustment program had not solved Somalia’s fiscal and budgetary problems, and some of the provisions worsened the situation. He notes that it did not seem possible to them that Somalia would ever repay the loans but the ambassador said  he was surprised that Somalia was still seeking more loans from lenders.

One of the issues he was greatly concerned about was the Population Question. He believed famines and wars were due to overpopulation and that something must be done about the population growth. He raised the issue without instruction from Washington with Siad Barre, who told him, to his surprise, that Somalia was underpopulated and needed more people to defend their country from Ethiopia. The ambassador here seems to be overstepping a little bit because he says that he wanted the population growth to be halted in Somalia and was on the opinion that the death of many people would restore the “balance of humans and their fragile environment”, but he laments “the civil war didn’t help restore the balance of nature but devastated the country further”. It is a callous and again sign of racism that he (ambassador Bridges) wanted more Somalis to die because somehow, he thought that the country was overpopulated. And more death of the Somali people was an acceptable and perhaps preferable remedy for eco balance. It is a shocking revealing admission of racism and utter lack of human sympathy on his part.

He had no instruction from Washington to raise Human Rights issues with the country’s leadership. Democracy and human rights were non-issues to Washington, and they were only concerned with the containment of Soviet expansion in third world countries. The west feared if they pushed for more political reform, the Third World countries would go to the Soviet Union as an alternative. The United States represented by ambassador Peter Bridges had no qualm about supporting a regime “at war with its own people”. Congress stopped the American support after the end of the cold war and the disintegration of the Soviets was in the offing. As a result of these dynamics, Somalia was no longer important to US interests.

The sad part of the book is when Sharif, a long-time driver for the embassy, hand overed his life savings to one of the embassy officers who he was expecting to take to outside the country, but he had locked it in the embassy locks, thus losing his lifetime-savings. The embassy only evacuated their citizens, turning down their Somali staff; and some of them, unfortunately, were killed in the embassy compound. The last US helicopter lifted from the embassy’s ground observing from above Somalia descending into civil war. The US was not blameless because they have been supporting a ruthless regime killing its own people, and haven’t lifted a finger to intervene; they didn’t even evacuate their Somali employees who desperately begged them for help.

Peter and other Ambassadors rightly predicted the dictator would not remain in power because of his advanced age and the collapse of government institutions around him, but they were not expecting the country would descend into chaos and bloodshed.

The book is a readable account enriched with sad anecdotes of Barre’s misrule and his mismanagement of western Aid by his regime.  However, the American ambassador didn’t assign any blame to himself or his government and other western governments’ role in the sad story of Somalia. He took no responsibilities for their support of the regime when it was serving their interests and thus prolonging Barre’s reign of terror. Finally, The Ambassador’s account is vivid and detailed with some tangible facts. But he came across through pages as a righteous self-centered and prejudiced white man who had no regard and iota of sympathy for the people of Somalia.

Organization: Somalia’s Achilles’ Heel

 In big cities around Somalia, citizens have formed professional associations such as doctors, engineers, and teachers. These associations, more often than not, descend to bickering over leadership and finally cease to exist. on the other hand, successful organizations, notwithstanding the fact that they provide vital services, have a questionable impact on the state-building agenda. This piece assesses why that is.

Historical Background

 Somalis were organized along clan lines for centuries. The population, predominantly pastoralists, had not often transcended their immediate family interests or shared common goals with others. The demanding environment of the pastoralist caused what Edward C. Banfield called “a moral familism” where everyone only fends for themselves. There were no associations beyond the immediate family that one could identify with. Those from outside were looked upon with suspicion and mistrust. Pastoralists widely believed unknown outsiders would only conspire against them.

Urbanized Nomads

With rapid rural-urban migration, historically nomadic folks started moving to cities, and as a result, cities had grown rapidly. Unlike life in rural communities, in cities, one would intermingle, sit in a class, play sports, meet at the job, create business partnerships, and befriend someone who might not necessarily be from one’s immediate family.

Because of this rapid rural-urban migration, the civil service and other government officials were dominated by a group the late writer Said Samatar called the “Transitional Generation”. This group who were among the first that moved from rural Somalia to the cities had no experience in running a state or mobilizing and orienting a society towards a collective public interest.

The modern state required a complex organization that the “Transitional Generation” lacked. The military government of Major General Mohamed Siad Barre had been able to orient and mobilize society toward self-sufficiency in the revolution’s early years. At the time, there was tremendous enthusiasm among the public to collectively build their country. It was the only time in Somalia’s history that social engineering and rapid modernization were possible, but it was squandered by a myopic military might that was only interested in clinching power. Many schools, hospitals, and government offices were built through self-help (Iskaa Wax u Qabso). However, the spirit and the enthusiasm for voluntary work was short-lived because the common man could not see the benefits of their hard work and soon after realized only benefited a privileged few.

Post-1991 Realities

Somalis have long been helping each other when crises like droughts, floods, or terrorist attacks occurred. Furthermore, there is no shortage of community-based initiatives. Puntland’s Grand Garacad port, a large-scale initiative funded through community resources, is a prime example of a successful initiative. However, there are countless other examples with various success rates. Initiatives such as the ad-hoc Fursad Fund, Kacdoonka Nabadda, and Caawi Walaal failed or short-lived because most of them failed to translate energies and efforts into organized, sustained, and most importantly, public interest-oriented entities. These initiatives fell short of people’s expectations for many reasons, but mainly because many of them are hijacked by a few narrow-minded individuals in pursuit of fame and fortune. 

In the last thirty years, and with the absence of a functioning state, three categories of organizations emerged.

The first category is clan-based organizations. Clans started to organize themselves with support from their kinsmen in the business sector or in the diaspora. Schools were built and tuition fees were paid. Small towns resided predominantly by particular clan members were built out of necessity due to the civil war or simply out of pride.

The second category is the business community and religious organizations. Although they have their own shortcomings, they have managed to successfully operate for a relatively long time.

Unlike other groups that prioritise clan affiliations, religious organizations have formed ideology and interest-based associations. Although they have not necessarily been immune from clan-based squabbles over leadership and resources, their membership is not strictly clan-based thus managing to persevere. Most of the education sector and social institutions are operated by religious groups that produced the post-civil war generation. However, this generation equipped mainly with dogma, have not been able to produce a workforce ready for public service.

The business community have also transcended parochial clan-based interests and formed nationwide businesses across clan lines. These interest-based associations have morphed into other spheres such as politics. For instance, an interest-based association will overlook clan affiliation and may endorse a particular politician to do their bidding in government.

The third category is the non-governmental organization (NGO). These are mostly established through the funding of Western and Arab countries. They all claim to be dedicated to improving people’s lives and livelihoods. As the sector developed, so do the questions over its actual impact on the lives of those it claims to serve. The rise of NGOs has also created a foreign aid dependency and the proliferation of what is now called “brief-case NGOs”. The term refers to the increasing number of addressless organisations that are run by a few individuals out of their laptops.

 Implications on the State Building Agenda

 Somali-led organizations whether religious, in business or community-based have made considerable progress. Some of these organizations have, against all odds, survived and existed for a long time. They filled in roles vacated by the state by providing vital services to those who need it the most, however, the ‘profit-before-people’ mentality coupled with the absence of accountability, regulations, and collective responsibility overrode the common interest.

Many of these organizations, particularly those engaged in telecommunications, logistics and private security services thrived during decades of civil strife and lawlessness and view a strong state as a threat to their interests.  Claire Elder, in her most recent research paper, provides empirical evidence of how, for instance, the dominance of the logistics economy in Somalia, as a system of ‘graft’ endogenous to state-building, has contributed to state failure.

On the other hand, although the Somali state is recovering, it struggles with questions of legitimacy and efficacy and has insufficient resources and technical capabilities to deliver services. Finalizing the constitution or building strong institutions alone do not guarantee strong social cohesion; what is called the social contract, is alien to the Somali society, therefore, the role of the state in society needs revisiting.

Civic education is not taught in Somali schools and is, perhaps, why volunteerism is looked at with suspicion. Introducing civic education to pupils at a young age will create a society where everyone deeply understands their role in society.

Successive governments should prioritize the creation of a just, equal, and merit-based society. The Somali state should be built on a consensus cognizant of our history, culture, and local needs. It must avoid and weed out any trace of “isomorphic mimicry” -a situation where a state gives the impression of being functional to obtain continued donor assistance without necessarily delivering for its citizens.

Empowering and organizing communities to undertake initiatives such as the Garacad Port is a welcome idea, but this needs to be guided by a state-led national vision for equitable growth and sustainability.

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Authors:

Abdiwahab M. Ali researches and writes about Somalia’s governance and post-conflict development. He can be reached at abdiwahabali@future.edu

Abdirahman A. Issa is a researcher of Somali History, culture, society and politics. His interests also include governance and development in fragile and post conflict contexts. He can be reached at Cadced99@gmail.com