UNDERSTANDING THE SOMALIA CONFLAGRATION: IDENTITY, POLITICAL ISLAM AND PEACEBUILDING: A BOOK REVIEW

The Publication of this book coincides with the occupation of Ethiopian troops in the capital city of Somalia and much of south-central regions. This incursion was carried out under the banner of the misguided US “war on terror” that resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians and the destruction of Mogadishu. The invasion gave birth to more militant Islamist group who wanted to adopt their version of Sharia in the country. The book’s two core topics are the Ethiopian interference and political Islam which have substantially diminished in the political arena in recent years. Ten years ago, Somalis were very much sensitive to the presence of Ethiopians, but now, we seldom hear any fuss about their presence.

Ethiopia and Kenya are formally members of the AMISOM (Recently changed to ATMIS) Mission, however, they have non-AMISOM troops in Somalia—with a presence in Hiiraan, Bay, Bakool, Gedo, and Kismayo. The intensity of the debate on adopting Sharia also subsided with the emergency of Al-Shabab and their use of heavy handedness to implement their own version of Sharia law. Nowadays, no one is talking about applying Sharia in the county, compared to 2010 when everyone was talking — willingly or conveniently. However, these debates will undoubtedly remain relevant as the book’s thesis.

In the book, Afyare examines Somalia’s conundrum: clan identity, political Islam, and the meddling of foreigners in the country’s internal affairs, proposing remedies he deemed suitable to the context. What makes the book interesting is that the author locates himself in the mix and brings the Islamist perspective to the table. He states that his worldview and understanding of Somali culture and Islam was shaped by the late poet, Hadraawi and Sheikh Mohamed Moallim. In addition, he uses handy his western education in analyzing and elucidating the Somali catastrophe.

He traces the sources of Somali conflict to the competition for resources and power, colonial legacy, and military repression. He mentions that the failure of many reconciliation conferences held in the neighboring countries was due to the meddling of Ethiopia and, to a lesser extent Kenya and the lack of will and capacity among the Somalis. Afyare claims that Kenya and Ethiopia imposed an “undefined and obscure form of federalism on Somalia”. He is right when he contends that there was no national debate and referendum on adopting Federalism, but he should be aware that the political environment was not conducive at the time — not even today. However, Afyare fails to notice the fact there was a genuine desire for Federalism among the people of the Southwest and Puntland. For Instance, Digil and Mirifle demanded Federalism before the independence, fearing the dominance of the Daarod and Hawiye clans. Puntland was the first state to adopt Federalism when the residents of the capital from that region were displaced from their homes and some killed in the bloody civil war, and many reconciliation conferences failed to bear fruit for seven years to reconstitute the collapsed central state and the capital was reduced to clan turf divided by warring clan warlords. Likewise, people from the southwest formed their own state before being invaded and destroyed by Hussein Aidid. Federalism was the result of brutal dictatorship and subsequent civil war — which caused a pervasive trust deficit among the Somalis. Nevertheless, Federalism is not a panacea, and Afyare rightly mentions some of the drawbacks that Somali Federalism face that warrants broader national debate.

Afyare maintains that the clan itself was not the cause of the Somali problem but the unscrupulous politicians who used it as a mobilization tool to gain resources and power at the expense of the suffering of their people. After many peace conferences failed to reconcile warring clans, 4.5 was adopted in Arta as a reconciliatory tool for the short term. The clan representation thus becomes the base to measure the government. The government’s legitimacy depends on convincing the clans and giving each clan a representation. If they feel less represented, they will not see the government as theirs, which represents their interest and will do everything to sabotage it, even taking arms against it. The Military dictatorship tried dishonestly to suppress and criminalize the clan while continually using and abusing its worst form. The closure of the space and tribalization of politics caused the clans to take arms and violently overthrow the government. The politicians continue to preach that tribalism is bad while practicing it and giving the government opportunities for their clans. The Military regime’s culture of not stating the tribe but practicing in secret continues today and is practiced hypocritically by both the citizens and politicians. Most of the people Afyare interviewed except the Islamists believed that ignoring and suppressing the clan would not bring any solution and suggested it must be faced as a reality.

Afyare believes one way to reconcile clan and the state is perhaps allocating parliamentary seats to clans but squashing its allocation in cabinet and bureaucracy and basing it on merit. He emphasizes the necessity of forging an inclusive Identity that people can share and identify with. He shows that Islam and clan identity were the two competing identities for the last three decades, and Somali Identity became an orphan with no defender and advocator. He stresses that Islam has a better chance for identity reconstruction since it resonates with most Somalis, but he does not remove the possibility of re-invoking nationalism in the future. It actually happened in 2017 when Farmajo was elected president when he campaigned on patriotism.

He examines US Policy toward Somalia. He describes it as flawed and full of blunders, first by supporting the military dictatorship who sank the country into civil war, then hastily leaving when some of their soldiers were killed and adopting a wait-and-see policy and then War on Terror  after 9/11 and supporting warlords and nodding Ethiopia to invade Somalia. He mentions that Ethiopia and less extent, Kenya wanted Somalia not to stand on its feet, fearing the strong Somali government may threaten their national interest and reclaim the Somali inhabited regions under their rule. He suggests that the international force that keeps the peace is needed in the short term to replace hostile neighbors. However, Afyare treats the Eritrean and Egypt meddling favorably and doesn’t consider that they have their own vested interest in perpetuating conflict in Somalia. Egypt always wanted Somalia to be at loggerhead with Ethiopia to safeguard the Nile River, and the Eriteria wanted to take their hostility to the Tigray regime, who then ruled in Addis, to Somalia; thus, Somalia became a battleground for these countries. Indeed Egypt was responsible for the sabotage of the Ethiopian-backed conference which was due to be held in Bossaso, and its preparation was ongoing when Egypt invited Hussein Aidid and Ali Mahdi to Cairo and gave cool  reception to Abdullahi Yusuf. The sabotage of Egypt of Bossaso Conference was the straw that broke the camel’s back and gave the impetus and momentum to establishing Puntland State —the first Federal Region in Somalia.

He notes that Islamism is a new phenomenon in Somalia, introduced by Somalis educated in Arab countries in the 1960s. Since the defeat of Sayid Mohamed, the Islamists have not played a significant role in the struggle for Independence and post-independence. They became a potent force to be reckoned with after the collapse of the state in 1991, dominating the social and economic spheres and striving to capture the state by any means possible — either through army or through peaceful means.

Political Islam in Somali gets ascension when Islamic Courts Union overturned much-loathed warlords In the South and restored the peace long craved by the citizens in that part of the country. For the first time in recent Somali History, the Islamists controlled a vast territory and called for establishing Sharia Based State in Somalia, contrary to the International backed Liberal order. The US and Ethiopia conspired to destroy the experiment many Somalis applauded and welcomed regardless of their clan. In fact, The UIC was welcomed by all the inhabited Somali regions and was not seen as a clan project— that even compelled Puntland and Somaliland to accept Sharia adoption in their territories conveniently.

However, afyare does not tackle the blunders made by the Islamists that caused to squander that rare opportunity. These mistakes include their vow to pray Eid in Addis Ababa, refusing to negotiate in good faith with the TFG as they were drunken by recently gained power and popularity and invading the seat of weak TFG based in Baioda. They were unaware of how the international system works and that US and regional governments would not allow them to rule in the country. That rare opportunity may be saved if the Islamists allowed to share power with the then embattled weak government and Somalia may have been saved  from the bloody Ethiopian occupation and later Al-Shabab’s reign of terror.

He points out several challenges the Islamist project faces. Among them is the perception that Hawiye dominates the Islamist Leadership, thus creating suspicion and mistrust of the project by other clans that may disadvantage them. It actually happened to clancize the Islamist project first by General Aidid when he fought Al-Itahad in Araare bridge near Kismayo in 1991 and accused them of being Darood. Similarly, Abdullahi Yusuf also portrayed Al-Itahad forces who fought   SSDF in 1992 as Hawiye aggressors. He notes that Islamists are cognizant that clan identity is a competitor to their Islamist ideology. Afyare underlines that the Islamist role is desirable, but external actors are bent on destroying it. The Islamists in the Arab world have not shown their governance system apart from their catchy slogan that “Islam is the solution”, and the Islamists in Somalia have no caliber of their peers in Arab World, and it is not clear how they would fare better if they seized power.

The education in the post-civil war was funded by Western NGOs who promote secular education and Arab NGOs who promote Arab culture and Islamic-based education. The two conflicting curricula have serious implications for Somalia’s future as they produced and continue to produce a generation imbued with different ideologies. The Islamist education benefited many people and filled out a gap left by the state, but unfortunately, some of them were teaching intolerant ideologies and became breeding grounds for extremists who later joined the Jihadist groups who wreak havoc in the country.

The Absence of state-planned education might make it impossible for social transformation. Afyare proposes to use the education system to reconstruct national Identity and devise an inclusive curriculum for the country since some scholars “complained certain clans wrote their Literature and narrative while using the state’s resource and imposed on others” Afyar also recommends adding a peace-building component to the curriculum and use of non-formal methods like poets to promote peace and cohesion among the Somalis.

Dr Afyare has produced a synoptic and concise introduction to the Somali conundrum. However, the book focuses on the South of the country while saying little about the self-declared Somaliland and the self-administrated Federal state of Puntland, their peace and state-building process, and their implication  on national state-building agenda. Perhaps he should title the book “Southern Conflagrations”. Otherwise, the book is well written and well researched and will serve as an Introductory for Somali Students and anyone interested in peace and conflict issues.

Abdirahman A. Issa is a researcher of Somali History, culture, society and politics. His interests also include governance and development in fragile and post conflict contexts. He can be reached at email:  Cadced99@gmail.com

PUNTLAND DEMOCRATIZATION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

The article first appeared at  Wardheernews on March 31,2021

Why Puntland's First Democratization Experiment Failed?

Puntland state was established in August 1998 as an autonomous region of Somalia. The first charter adopted to transition the administration from a clan-based system to multiparty democracy in three years never materialized. The administration at the time did not strive, though nascent, to put in place the necessary infrastructure to hold elections due to, as they put it, enormous security and economic challenges. And there was limited time to democratize Puntland. Finally, the president of the time strived for the parliament to extend his tenure, leading to constitutional crises culminating in a full-blown war.

In the intervening administrations, Abdirahman Farole's government took the first initial step towards democratization. It completed the draft constitution ratified by the constituent assembly in April 2012. The adopted constitution paved the way for multiparty system modalities such as drafting key electoral laws and establishing the transitional electoral commission. The commission was made up of nine members; five were appointed by the president and four by the parliament, and the parliament passed local election law in September 2012. In April 2013, the parliament made amendments removing voter registration and ID from the law. The new amendment caused controversy; subsequently, two political associations boycotted the election. The parliament has passed the political association law in June 2012; hence TPEC registered six political associations in March 2013. The local council election slated to take place in July 2013 was cancelled due to the eruption of violence in Qardho and Galkayo, as the elders and politicians alike had been all along calling for the government to stop the election all but unheeded.

There were several attributed reasons that caused the failure of the first experiment to democratize. At the beginning of the process, there was suspicion on the part of the public about the government's motive since it started the program merely a year before the end of its term. The process was hasty, and the government failed to conduct a public consultation with key stakeholders, including politicians, youth, women, and traditional elders who wield significant power in the state. Obviously, the timeframe to conduct wide-ranging civic and voter education was limited. Most of the people in Puntland are young adults who have never exercised their voting rights. In that respect, the administration's respective agencies for the election failed to put in place modalities, such as the process of casting a vote and their rights and responsibilities as a voter, for them to do so.

The political associations raised concerns about the Neutrality of the TPEC, who failed to, as aforesaid, listen and take to account the concerns and suggestions of the political associations and the public as well. It was perceived as part and parcel of the government and Horsed party. The situation was aggravated by the resignation of two commission members due to impartiality with reference to the commission.

Rumours had it other surreptitiously camouflaged as genuine associations were created and bankrolled by the government to stave off the challenge posed by the in-contention opposition associations. The cancellation of voter registration was one of the reasons the political associations mistrusted the process and saw it as a plot to dishonestly arrange the result of the election before it happened. The political associations wrote a letter to the donors raising their concern about the cancellation of voter registration and stated that they wouldn't contest unless the voter registration was reinstated. There was a lack of dispute resolution mechanisms in place to handle election disputes.

Furthermore, the government failed to establish a constitutional court, which was one of the reasons the political associations mistrusted the fairness of the election process since there was no way to seek redress. Neither was there an alternative dispute resolution model to handle the election process. The oppositions argued freedom of expression and assembly are sin quo none to a free and fair election. The government restricted the media from broadcasting dissenting voices. Also, some of the media outlets that are suspected of being favourable to the opposing associations had been shut down all together. The final nail of the coffin had been the banning of assembly, which had consigned Puntland's first democratization experiment into the penumbra.

Will Said Deni's government achieve the second experiment to implement the multiparty system?

Even though Abdiwali Gaas appointed the TPEC two years before the end of his term, he has not, just like his predecessors, established the democratization process in the land and, ultimately, for the citizens to elect their leaders. The late appointment of the commission was the major cause of the failure as the time had not been sufficient enough. Nevertheless, the public was sceptical and suspicious about the process. The donors were also not ready to fund the process due to the delay in nominating the Transitional electoral commission.

President Said Abdullahi was the incumbent who nominated the electoral commission in the first year of his administration. This presaged to the public that the government, this time round, is serious about implementing a democratization system in Puntland. As per the TPEC annual report, it has achieved some milestones that will pave the way for holding one person, one, vote election in Puntland for the first time in its existence. The TPEC registered and certified 10 political associations that met the requirement. It reviewed some electoral laws and was passed by the parliament; recruited key staff for HQ and that of districts earmarked as a litmus test before rolling it out throughout Puntland regions; put in place the legal frameworks regarding the multiparty system modes, and setting out the tender for procurement of biometric registration system.

The voter registration for early election in Eyl, Ufeyn and Qardho was slated to be conducted between 16- 29 may 2021, while concomitantly, the parliament enacted the voter education law. Finally, the members of electoral dispute resolution were appointed by the commission.

Challenges

Even though the commission has achieved key milestones, there are considerable challenges that might hinder the process, of whom the commission's dependency on an unpredictable donor, without which hampers the delivery of electoral activities, stands tall. The Puntland contribution to the commission is minuscule and barely covers the operational cost of the offices. There is limited awareness on the part of the public on how the multiparty system works, as the successive administrations didn't prepare, as far as their rights and responsibilities is concerned, for the citizens to take part in civic life. The weapons in the hands of the public might create an unconducive environment and cause violence and unrest if certain constituents/sub-clans felt injustice for some voting irregularities/suppression, certain constituents/sub-clans felt injustice.

Equally important, the traditional elders who wield significant power could pose a challenge to democratization, as they might perceive the process of migrating from a clan-based system to a multiparty system, will render them un-influential and confine them in the traditional agnate contractual principles.

Certainly, media freedom has been curtailed during the tenure of Said Deni, as several reporters were arrested for broadcasting unpleasant news for his administration. In that regard, as democracy needs to operate in a free environment, the administration should restrain itself and let the mass media operate freely in covering the election.

It's also unclear how the commission will hold elections in districts controlled by Somaliland and what modalities representatives, given their constituents are under hostile administration, from these districts will be elected. Essential pillars, such as the constitutional court, to solve the election disputes and the demarcations of the districts, have not been established yet. Finally, the covid-19 pandemic is the biggest challenge and may hamper the whole process. 

Recommendations

• The commission should conduct a wider civic education in all cities before the election to inform citizens of their rights and responsibilities.
• They should also work to build the confidence and trust of the people to the election process.
• They also must engage with key stakeholders and listen to their thoughts and concerns regarding the process.
• The traditional elders who wield significant power should also be meaningfully engaged in the process.
• The Puntland resource is insufficient to support the election; therefore, the International community should strive to provide technical and financial support to the commission.
• The government should hasten the establishment of the constitutional court to ascertain that, this time round, it's a series about the process of democratization, which in turn lifts the confidence of the political associations. 
• The Ministry of Interior should also expedite the demarcation of districts. 
• The government should also formulate a plan to disarm the clans ahead of the election.
• The multiparty system is long overdue in Puntland, and the current administration must, at all cost, seize the opportunity and implement it.

SAFIRKA: AN AMERICAN ENVOY: A BOOK REVIEW

Book: Safiirka
Author: Peter Bridges
Publisher:  Kent State University Press
Pages: 266
Language: English
Publication date‏: ‎2000

Peter Bridges is an American career diplomat who has served in American foreign service for three decades. He was posted in Panama, Russia, Czechoslovakia, and Italy before being appointed ambassador to Somalia in the mid-eighties.  In his memoir Safirka: An American envoy, he mainly talks about his tenure in Somalia from 1984-1986. He portrays Somalia as a country with poor, sunny, and proud people and, more importantly, with a begging bowl with an insatiable, greedy and ruthless dictator at the helm. He was appointed to manage America’s largest Aid in sub-Saharan Africa, amounting to 120 millions of military and civilian Aid, which was a large amount of money at the time.

The ambassador’s time coincides with a renewal of American interest in the turbulent but strategic Horn of Africa. With the peak of the Cold War and the Ogaden War fiasco, the US government was determined to sway Somalia from the Soviet orbit. A deal was reached between the two governments that the US would have access to military and naval facilities in Somalia in return for military and economic Aid. As per the Reagan Administration National Security Decision Directive of 1982, “The Horn of Africa is important to the United States primarily because of its strategic location with respect to the Persian Gulf/Southwest Asia region.” However, Peter believed Somali’s strategic importance was overrated and not as important as Washington said. Even before he was appointed as Ambassador, Peter’s attitude towards Somalia was overly negative, and he may have harbored racism towards Somalis. After all, he was a Southerner and whites who hail from that part of the United States are known for their hostilities towards black people.

Peter provides a glimpse of the general atmosphere of repression and fear that permeated in Somalia at the time. He delineated what it was like to serve as Ambassador under a totalitarian regime deftly exploiting the cold war rivalry between the Western democracies and communist countries. The ambassador narrated his first encounter with the late dictator. When he  finally met, Siad Barre warned him not to listen to traitors, and if he (the ambassador) wanted facts about the country, he should come to him directly any time. He even played a duplicitous game with him when he ordered his soldiers not to allow Somali invitees to a banquet thrown by the US Embassy for Somali students who graduated from American Universities. He later apologized to the ambassador and told him that it was his subordinates who acted without his permission. The deceit and trickery were his modus operandi with his dealing with both Somalis and foreigners for 21 years of his misrule.

Former President Barre

A recurring theme throughout the book is the Aid West Poured to Somalia and how the military regime mismanaged and misappropriated it. He describes how the Somali officials from Siad Barre to the lowest ranking officials were demanding more Aid to be provided to Somalia. He portrayed them as hungry wolves who clamored for more alms to devour without a hint of shame or irony.

A British Ambassador to Somalia and Arabist recommended Peter to read “The First Footsteps in East Africa” by Richard Burton. In the book, Mr. Burton said that Arabs called Somalia Bilaad Wax Isii(The land of give me something ).

Somali was receiving a large amount of humanitarian, development and military Aid during the ambassador’s stay in Somalia. But Peter did not see any meaningful impact on the ordinary citizens since the Somali Government’s officials were embezzling the aid. Most of the Aid was intended for the refugees from the Ogaden, whose number the regime inflated, but when he visited the camps, he was not convinced of the Somali government’s figure.

Amb Peter observed most development projects did crumble after a few years of completion due to a lack of maintenance by the Somali officials. If the projects were to succeed, he argued, they must be run by foreigners for many years. Basically, Somali officials were irresponsible, incompetent and had no regard for the future wellbeing of their country.

He tells how the Somali government was creating unnecessary fear that Ethiopia was invading Somalia in order to elicit more Military support from friendly foreign countries.

Amb Peter was astounded how “The Land of Give Me Something” even wanted to get Aid from the Catholics Church without allowing it to proselytize. The ambassador says the greed of Somali officials had known no limits. He said they would have done anything to squeeze a few dollars from anybody that is willing to spare some changes. One of their schemes to get more was come up by the country’s vice president General Samatar when he suggested establishing a diplomatic relationship with the Vatican through a former white house official.

The desperation for money even prompted Siad Barre to mend fences with Libya —the arch enemy of America —to get Aid from them and to stop their support to Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF).” Somalia’s approaches to South Africa, Libya and the Soviet Union might reflect venality of Siad Barre and his foster brother (Abdirahman Jama Barre), “he notes

He describes how shamelessly Somalia organized an International Conference on Drought Emergency, despite the rain beginning to pour. The donors advised against organizing the conference and warned the Somali officials not to embarrass their country. Still, they went ahead, and to their utter disappointment, no additional pledge was made by the donors. A delegation from Italy who traveled to Beldweyne to assess the drought situation couldn’t land because constant rains had flooded the runway.

He recalls a time he was stunned and angered when he was informed the clothes 21 October marchers wearing (one day use) had taken a government factory to produce them for many months while Siad Barre had constantly been imploring him to supply uniforms for his army, telling him they “were half naked and he had no money to buy anything, and his friends didn’t want to help.”

Amb Peter recognizes that the IMF structural adjustment program had not solved Somalia’s fiscal and budgetary problems, and some of the provisions worsened the situation. He notes that it did not seem possible to them that Somalia would ever repay the loans but the ambassador said  he was surprised that Somalia was still seeking more loans from lenders.

One of the issues he was greatly concerned about was the Population Question. He believed famines and wars were due to overpopulation and that something must be done about the population growth. He raised the issue without instruction from Washington with Siad Barre, who told him, to his surprise, that Somalia was underpopulated and needed more people to defend their country from Ethiopia. The ambassador here seems to be overstepping a little bit because he says that he wanted the population growth to be halted in Somalia and was on the opinion that the death of many people would restore the “balance of humans and their fragile environment”, but he laments “the civil war didn’t help restore the balance of nature but devastated the country further”. It is a callous and again sign of racism that he (ambassador Bridges) wanted more Somalis to die because somehow, he thought that the country was overpopulated. And more death of the Somali people was an acceptable and perhaps preferable remedy for eco balance. It is a shocking revealing admission of racism and utter lack of human sympathy on his part.

He had no instruction from Washington to raise Human Rights issues with the country’s leadership. Democracy and human rights were non-issues to Washington, and they were only concerned with the containment of Soviet expansion in third world countries. The west feared if they pushed for more political reform, the Third World countries would go to the Soviet Union as an alternative. The United States represented by ambassador Peter Bridges had no qualm about supporting a regime “at war with its own people”. Congress stopped the American support after the end of the cold war and the disintegration of the Soviets was in the offing. As a result of these dynamics, Somalia was no longer important to US interests.

The sad part of the book is when Sharif, a long-time driver for the embassy, hand overed his life savings to one of the embassy officers who he was expecting to take to outside the country, but he had locked it in the embassy locks, thus losing his lifetime-savings. The embassy only evacuated their citizens, turning down their Somali staff; and some of them, unfortunately, were killed in the embassy compound. The last US helicopter lifted from the embassy’s ground observing from above Somalia descending into civil war. The US was not blameless because they have been supporting a ruthless regime killing its own people, and haven’t lifted a finger to intervene; they didn’t even evacuate their Somali employees who desperately begged them for help.

Peter and other Ambassadors rightly predicted the dictator would not remain in power because of his advanced age and the collapse of government institutions around him, but they were not expecting the country would descend into chaos and bloodshed.

The book is a readable account enriched with sad anecdotes of Barre’s misrule and his mismanagement of western Aid by his regime.  However, the American ambassador didn’t assign any blame to himself or his government and other western governments’ role in the sad story of Somalia. He took no responsibilities for their support of the regime when it was serving their interests and thus prolonging Barre’s reign of terror. Finally, The Ambassador’s account is vivid and detailed with some tangible facts. But he came across through pages as a righteous self-centered and prejudiced white man who had no regard and iota of sympathy for the people of Somalia.

Organization: Somalia’s Achilles’ Heel

 In big cities around Somalia, citizens have formed professional associations such as doctors, engineers, and teachers. These associations, more often than not, descend to bickering over leadership and finally cease to exist. on the other hand, successful organizations, notwithstanding the fact that they provide vital services, have a questionable impact on the state-building agenda. This piece assesses why that is.

Historical Background

 Somalis were organized along clan lines for centuries. The population, predominantly pastoralists, had not often transcended their immediate family interests or shared common goals with others. The demanding environment of the pastoralist caused what Edward C. Banfield called “a moral familism” where everyone only fends for themselves. There were no associations beyond the immediate family that one could identify with. Those from outside were looked upon with suspicion and mistrust. Pastoralists widely believed unknown outsiders would only conspire against them.

Urbanized Nomads

With rapid rural-urban migration, historically nomadic folks started moving to cities, and as a result, cities had grown rapidly. Unlike life in rural communities, in cities, one would intermingle, sit in a class, play sports, meet at the job, create business partnerships, and befriend someone who might not necessarily be from one’s immediate family.

Because of this rapid rural-urban migration, the civil service and other government officials were dominated by a group the late writer Said Samatar called the “Transitional Generation”. This group who were among the first that moved from rural Somalia to the cities had no experience in running a state or mobilizing and orienting a society towards a collective public interest.

The modern state required a complex organization that the “Transitional Generation” lacked. The military government of Major General Mohamed Siad Barre had been able to orient and mobilize society toward self-sufficiency in the revolution’s early years. At the time, there was tremendous enthusiasm among the public to collectively build their country. It was the only time in Somalia’s history that social engineering and rapid modernization were possible, but it was squandered by a myopic military might that was only interested in clinching power. Many schools, hospitals, and government offices were built through self-help (Iskaa Wax u Qabso). However, the spirit and the enthusiasm for voluntary work was short-lived because the common man could not see the benefits of their hard work and soon after realized only benefited a privileged few.

Post-1991 Realities

Somalis have long been helping each other when crises like droughts, floods, or terrorist attacks occurred. Furthermore, there is no shortage of community-based initiatives. Puntland’s Grand Garacad port, a large-scale initiative funded through community resources, is a prime example of a successful initiative. However, there are countless other examples with various success rates. Initiatives such as the ad-hoc Fursad Fund, Kacdoonka Nabadda, and Caawi Walaal failed or short-lived because most of them failed to translate energies and efforts into organized, sustained, and most importantly, public interest-oriented entities. These initiatives fell short of people’s expectations for many reasons, but mainly because many of them are hijacked by a few narrow-minded individuals in pursuit of fame and fortune. 

In the last thirty years, and with the absence of a functioning state, three categories of organizations emerged.

The first category is clan-based organizations. Clans started to organize themselves with support from their kinsmen in the business sector or in the diaspora. Schools were built and tuition fees were paid. Small towns resided predominantly by particular clan members were built out of necessity due to the civil war or simply out of pride.

The second category is the business community and religious organizations. Although they have their own shortcomings, they have managed to successfully operate for a relatively long time.

Unlike other groups that prioritise clan affiliations, religious organizations have formed ideology and interest-based associations. Although they have not necessarily been immune from clan-based squabbles over leadership and resources, their membership is not strictly clan-based thus managing to persevere. Most of the education sector and social institutions are operated by religious groups that produced the post-civil war generation. However, this generation equipped mainly with dogma, have not been able to produce a workforce ready for public service.

The business community have also transcended parochial clan-based interests and formed nationwide businesses across clan lines. These interest-based associations have morphed into other spheres such as politics. For instance, an interest-based association will overlook clan affiliation and may endorse a particular politician to do their bidding in government.

The third category is the non-governmental organization (NGO). These are mostly established through the funding of Western and Arab countries. They all claim to be dedicated to improving people’s lives and livelihoods. As the sector developed, so do the questions over its actual impact on the lives of those it claims to serve. The rise of NGOs has also created a foreign aid dependency and the proliferation of what is now called “brief-case NGOs”. The term refers to the increasing number of addressless organisations that are run by a few individuals out of their laptops.

 Implications on the State Building Agenda

 Somali-led organizations whether religious, in business or community-based have made considerable progress. Some of these organizations have, against all odds, survived and existed for a long time. They filled in roles vacated by the state by providing vital services to those who need it the most, however, the ‘profit-before-people’ mentality coupled with the absence of accountability, regulations, and collective responsibility overrode the common interest.

Many of these organizations, particularly those engaged in telecommunications, logistics and private security services thrived during decades of civil strife and lawlessness and view a strong state as a threat to their interests.  Claire Elder, in her most recent research paper, provides empirical evidence of how, for instance, the dominance of the logistics economy in Somalia, as a system of ‘graft’ endogenous to state-building, has contributed to state failure.

On the other hand, although the Somali state is recovering, it struggles with questions of legitimacy and efficacy and has insufficient resources and technical capabilities to deliver services. Finalizing the constitution or building strong institutions alone do not guarantee strong social cohesion; what is called the social contract, is alien to the Somali society, therefore, the role of the state in society needs revisiting.

Civic education is not taught in Somali schools and is, perhaps, why volunteerism is looked at with suspicion. Introducing civic education to pupils at a young age will create a society where everyone deeply understands their role in society.

Successive governments should prioritize the creation of a just, equal, and merit-based society. The Somali state should be built on a consensus cognizant of our history, culture, and local needs. It must avoid and weed out any trace of “isomorphic mimicry” -a situation where a state gives the impression of being functional to obtain continued donor assistance without necessarily delivering for its citizens.

Empowering and organizing communities to undertake initiatives such as the Garacad Port is a welcome idea, but this needs to be guided by a state-led national vision for equitable growth and sustainability.

---

Authors:

Abdiwahab M. Ali researches and writes about Somalia’s governance and post-conflict development. He can be reached at abdiwahabali@future.edu

Abdirahman A. Issa is a researcher of Somali History, culture, society and politics. His interests also include governance and development in fragile and post conflict contexts. He can be reached at Cadced99@gmail.com

Reconfiguring the Somali Nation: Changing conversations, shifting paradigms:A book Review.

 Since the collapse of the central government in 1991, Somalis and foreigners have been looking for answers to the causes of the demise of the Somali state and how it can be resurrected. Perhaps the search for answers befits the Somali saying: ninba Dahab lumay, si u doon doon (everyone searches the lost gold in their own way). The dominant narrative holds that the Somali state collapsed due to ‘clannism, corruption and dictatorship’ and Abdirachid M. Ismail’s book

‘Reconfiguring the Somali Nation: Changing conversations, shifting paradigms’ argues that these are symptoms of what he calls the failure of the “Somali Union Project” which, he believes, was dead on arrival at its inception in 1960. Abdirachid offers an alternative perspective on the debate on state failure and proposes fresh ways the country can be reconstructed from the bottom up, as the Somali saying goes: haani guntay ka tolantaa (a wooden bucket is sewn from the bottom up).

Devoid of local context, Caddaan theoroticians of state building have, for thirty years, used Somalia as a petri dish to test out their theories. However, Somali academicians are turning the page and have started to untangle Somalia’s governance challenges. Localised perspectives are offering fresh takes that are contextually and historically suitable. Abdirachid Ismail is one of the few scholars who turned away from the conventional wisdom of blaming clannism on Somalia’s ills and provides new insights into the Somali state collapse, which he argues, is rooted in “culture”.

In this book, Abdirachid provides a historical background of the evolution of the ‘Somali Union Project’ and the causes of its failure. He differentiates the ‘Somali unity’ which he describes as a people who share a common language, culture, and way of life and the ‘Somali union’, which is a political project to unify Somali people into one state, president, and parliament. He argues that ethnic unity is an established fact, but the political union project was imported and a colonial construct.

He contends that Sayid Mohamed was the first Somali to appeal to the Somalis to transcend the clan and tried to form a trans-tribal project to fight the colonialists, but his project was dealt a fatal blow when most clans refused to follow him and toe his line. Sayid Mohamed was defeated, he maintains, not by the British but inadequate support from Somalis and their rejection of the “trans-tribal power of the Sayid”. The project was continued, he adds, by the Somalis who travelled to the Muslim and Western world and were “strongly influenced by foreign conception of state building”.

He states that the social organisation of Somalis was incompatible with the union project. Somalis have been under clan chiefs who administered through consensus and had no experience in a highly centralised system. Therefore, the foreign conception of state-building was antithesis to their mode of organisation. The inherent structure of the society was that every man is for himself and never recognises any authority above him except that one of almighty. Somalis were not accustomed to the complex organization required by the modern state. The colonial and post-colonial leaders have disrupted Somalis’ way of life and imposed a system ill-suited to their context. Unlike Europeans, Somalis were refused the privilege to draw from their tradition and experience and to gradually morph into the modern State.

The Somali Youth League (SYL) and the nationalist movements succeeded, to some extent, in raising the consciousness of Somalis to free themselves from the yoke of colonialism causing nationalism and self-determination to spread like a wildfire in all Somali-inhabited regions. However, the post-colonial leaders could not reconcile Somalis’ tribal way of organising themselves and the imported system of centralised governance inherited from the departed colonialists. The State ended up operating only in the urban centres, while the vast countryside was left to traditional leaders to govern through time-tested customary laws.

Mohamed Siad Barre’s repressive regime worsened the situation after imposing Marxism-Leninism ideology and criminalised clan identity, while he and his military junta practiced it in secret. Mohamed Siad Barre further centralised the system and became “the absolute Sultan of Somali clans, but without the legitimacy given by the customary clan laws”. Abdirachid notes that post-colonial leaders were transforming society at a fast pace incompatible with the natural progression of society. Ironically Barre’s socialist rule prompted all clans to rise and overthrow his regime. The clan reasserted itself as a potent force and reigned supreme to the extent that each clan returned to and regrouped in their ancestorial turf creating the modern-day federal member states.

During colonisation, he says, Somalis were separated and divided into five, but now, the two entities that united in 1960 are no longer together and the core in the south is also fragmented and this, he argues, is due to the imported Western system of governance. Abdirachid calls Somalis to come to terms with the Somali Union Project’s failure and recommends the use of Xeer, Somalis’ centuries-old customary law, to reconstruct the state. He advocated for how Xeer can be used to reconstruct the Somali nation. He recommends adopting a loose system of federalism based on kinship.

The author criticises the Somali intelligentsia, who argue that the clan is divisive and unsuitable for modern times without proposing an alternative.

There is a disconnect between the Somali individual and their state. The state is still alien to most Somalis who rarely interact with it. The Somali individual interacts with three unreconciled legal systems: secular, customary law (Xeer) and Sharia law. The Somali customary law is the most original tool Somalis have ever devised to solve their problems. However, the Xeer is negatively affected by urbanization, education, internal migration, political corruption and general moral decadence1. The Xeer suffered from a lack of adaptability to the ever-changing and complex modern world but still is the most useful tool for conflict resolution, even in the urban centres in Puntland and Somaliland. He mentions how Somalis in the North have been able to achieve and sustain peace due to their time-tested traditional ways rather than contemporary conflict resolution methods.

Furthermore, the Justice system in Somalia is broken and mired by corruption, and lack of enforcement, thus the People of Somaliland and Puntland still rely on traditional elders for conflict resolution through Xeer.

Abdirachid argues that the only way Somalis can be reconstituted is by returning to basics and their clan-based customary laws.

The author refutes the notion that the more the state is centralised, the more the clan diminishes, and the more the state is decentralised, the more the clan becomes prominent. The author does not provide a plausible explanation for this argument and contends that clannism should not be looked through the “restrictive lens” of the West but should be situated in its “sociological, historical, and geographical reality”.

Abdirachid’s argument is not fully developed in the book as he does not adequality address the incompatibility of the customary law and the modern state or how, since the clock can’t be turned back to the old system, to reconcile the two.

Abdirachid does not discuss the increasing role of politicised Islam in the last three decades and what the role of religion would be in reconfiguring the Somali nation. Nevertheless, the book warrants to be widely read and discussed by intellectuals and policy makers who, I doubt, has the appetite or inclination to find a system that is suitable to the Somali experience.

 

Reference(s)

1. Ismail Ali Ismail. (2009) Governance: The Scourge and Hope of Somalia (Trafford Publishing). p.490.

Back to Mogadishu:Memoirs of a Somali Pastor: A BOOK REVIEW

Book: Back to Mogadishu

Author: Mohamed Aden Sheikh
Published :Independently published 
Pages: 389

Publication date: ‎2021

Mohamed Aden Sheikh was a surgeon by profession and educated in Italy. He served a long time as Minister of Health and later for a brief stint as Minister of culture and information for The Military regime . He was a reformist and modernist who wanted to transform Somalia into a modern country along Socialist lines, but his good intention was to no avail for he was finally put in jail for 6 years. His memoir “Back to Mogadishu” chronicles his life and ambition in Somalia, which ended in catastrophe and tragedy of epic proportions.

He was a leftist ideologue and interlocutor of the Military and the civilian secretaries. He became a leftist while studying in Italy since their ideals of social justice and freedom resonated with him, and they supported the rights of the colonized people for self-determination. “The fact that I was an African whose ideal was the liberation of Somalia and the decolonization of the entire continent meant that I almost automatically saw eye to eye with the culture of the left,” he notes.

He got in trouble with right-wing groups while touring Italy to educate them on the negative impact of colonialism, especially the Italians, on the colonized people. The right-wing reported him for “offending the national pride” and “defamation of the Italian state.” He was put on trial and vindicated by the court for not committing acts that may constitute a crime. 

Contrary to popular belief, Mohamed argues that there was “no international plot behind the coup,” and the Military was planning to stage the coup in January but postponed it when the news was leaked. Siad Barre wanted to act, Mohamed states, since Egal wanted him to remove from his job, send him abroad and appoint his position to a northerner, Ainanshe Guled.

Mohamed mentions that General Aidid was nominated to “liaison between the Military and Young technocrats who were asked to draft a rough development project for Somalia. “The technocrats from different backgrounds (doctors, engineers, agronomists, economists, and jurists) teamed up. According to Aden, they presented a project that was instrumental to the achievements of the regime’s early years. He claims they suggested socialistic choices even though they didn’t use the term “Socialism.”

He was an idealist who believed western domination was the reason for the backwardness and that socialism was the only path to rapid social and economic development. He notes that the civilian and military working in tandem was rare in third-world countries.

The nine civil secretaries agreed to work with the military, and their role was merely “technical and administrative,” and their plans were contingent upon their approval. The military retained legislative power, and the civilians were cognizant of their preeminence since they were instigators of the coup. Mohamed thought it was in the country’s best interest if power was concentrated in a few “safe hands.” In the process, he admits, they aided and abetted Siad Barre to become an absolute dictator who, with his unfettered power, led to the country’s demise.

He was of the opinion that continuity and political stability were paramount to reform, thus, the coups must be avoided at any cost.

In 1973, Mohamed argues he and his friend Weyrah, the Minister of Finance, informed the president of the need for a constitution, a parliament, and a political party. He claims their relationship with the Military deteriorated when Somalia joined the Arab league. He argues the decision was shrouded in secrecy, and the military did not consult them; thus, he tendered his resignation. He contends Somalia would be better served as an ally, not as a member of a League who was characterized by constant division and bickering among themselves.

Mohamed Aden argues, quite strangely, that civilians did not know until 1973 of the effects of the draconian laws enacted by the military and that a lot of people were suffering dreadfully in prisons since they were distracted to “improve the life of the entire population.” However, he acknowledges that they didn’t prioritize freedom and individual rights.

Mohamed continued to infuriate the dictator by constantly demanding reform on many occasions. He always believed there was room for reform. When the party was established in 1976, he expected, as promised, the legislative and presidential elections would take place, but nothing has changed, and the regime became ruthless and brutal. Several times he tendered his resignation to Siad Barre, as he claims, and requested not to be re-appointed, and if he did, he would resign publicly. He lost his ministry in a cabinet reshuffle in 1982 but retained his parliamentary job and the party. He drew up an institutional reform with his group of reformers, Gacaliye, Ali Khalif, Warsame Juquf, Dhigic Dhigic, and Ahmed Ashkir Botan. They suggested, among other things, a program to deal with the economic crisis, redefine foreign policy, and create a prime ministerial position. Siad Barre rejected their proposal outrightly. He met with Siad Barre a few days before he was arrested and told him the country needed “drastic measures.” Still, Siad was infuriated by his stubbornness and accused him of “spreading poisonous” and encouraging the young intellectuals to become “disenchanted with the regime.”

Mohamed’s reformist friends left the country one by one, but he decided, as he claims to stay in the country, to confront the dictator and take the risk. Perhaps, he was thinking he would not be arrested since he was a clansman of the dictator. He was arrested along with Omar Haji Masale while visiting Baidoa. Ismail Ali Abokar, Omar Arte, and Osman Jeelle were also arrested in Mogadishu. Mohamed claims he thought the special prisons were “propaganda against the regime” until he was locked for 6 years in Labaatan Jirow maximum prison–one of the many infamous prisons. He felt betrayed by the government he served for 12 years and was jailed for no apparent reason. He was in solitude, anguishing for 6 years, and was even refused books let alone seeing his family. He was released after a farce trial but was put under house arrest until October 1988. 

Mohamed had an ambition and believed there was an opportunity to transform Somalia into a modern state. With the birth of one-party system, he thought they could fight within the party and push their reformist agenda, but their plans and ambitions were foiled and squandered by a myopic military.

He fled to Italy in 1989 after observing the country he was working on his transformation was turned into a family affair and beyond redemption.

The book was translated into Somali by a young progressive leftist, Abdiaziz Aw-Guudcadde, who translated Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth and Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Hiil Press will publish the book, and it will come out in 2023.

It’s a memoir of an idealist who had grand ideas and dreams to modernize his country but ended in disappointment and failure. 

It’s a good read for the young generation interested in their history recorded by one of the actors who witnessed the evil of colonization, the birth of nationalism, and the struggle for independence, parliamentary democracy, military dictatorship, and civil war.

FRAMING SOMALIA BEYOND AFRICA’S MERCHANTS OF MISERY: BOOK REVIEW

Abdi Samatar’s new book Framing Somalia Beyond Africa’s Merchants of Misery is another well-reasoned and researched takedown on the status quo of his country, Somalia. Professor Samatar displayed through the pages of this well-timed book, his age-long abhorrence towards the rent-seeking ruling elites of his country whose only aim and competence seems to be and was to fleece the country. According to him, the elites be it political elites, business people or the clergy are capable of only one thing: to enrich themselves at the expenses of the ordinary masses. Once again, Professor Samatar was not shy from deploying another unsparing salvo of searing criticism at the foot of those corrupt elites who are the primary sponsors of the mess that the country is in right now and speaking truth to power. It's a continuation of his relentless critique of bad state of affairs of his country ,the lords of development and corrupt political elite who partnered with them to perpetuate permanent misery of their helpless people. Professor Samatar is one of the few intellectuals who have been speaking and amplifying the voice for the voiceless. You can disagree with his cynicism but he speaks the feeling of millions of Somalis who have no voice .

At the preamble, he briefly touches on his intellectual journey that begets his radical dissent. As a young undergraduate student, he read Alex Haley’s book on Malcolm X. The book was not as he said on Somalia but offered a critical analysis of racialized US society. He claimed that Haley’s book “prompted him” to think differently about the materials published by non-Somalis on Somalia. He then read radical development theories and discovered the Dependency Theory.

At the University of California, Berkeley, where he was doing his PhD , he took course on recent development in African’s political economy and read the works of the likes of Mamdani, Walter, Samir Amin. The course gave him the tools to understand how the Somali studies is detached from the African Studies debates and dynamics of colonial and postcolonial power relationship. Abdi Samatar thereafter started to challenge the dominant framing of Somalis by the orientalist.

He narrates several encounters he had with westerners who set the Somali agenda and saw first-hand of asymmetrical power relationship between them and Somalis. The NGO trade the misery of Somalis while getting hefty salaries and hardship allowance at their comfort zone in Nairobi . Their business depends of the status quo and permanent statelessness. They don’t hire critical Somalis; they only hire those who toe their line. The corrupt political elite support their agenda without questioning while they get their share at the expense of humiliation and suffering of their people.

The framing of Somalis is based on early anthropological works in the north by the British Social anthropologist I.M Lewis. Samatar engaged head to head with Lewis, who contend the identify of Somalis is determined by birth and only way you can understand them is through their clan ,while Samatar disputed and argued that there is no single variable. Lewis who was an indisputable authority and guru of Somali Studies for many years surprised his audacity and label him as “westernized elite”.

Chapter 1, He provides thorough analysis of the dominant school of Somali Studies led by Lewis who offer clan as the single variable analysis of Somali problem, an alternative framework that demonstrates politicized clan as responsible for Somali tragedy. Lewis fails to take stock, professor argues, the impact of colonial rule, commercialization of the livestock, urbanization and emerging of political and economic class in his analysis. He analysis and rebutted some of the works by the Lewis disciples (Mainly Caddaan) who framed social , political and cultural problems along his perspective. Postcolonial leaders failed, professor underscores, to reform colonial institutions and to make identity that transcend tribe and make the state work for all the people.

Somalia somehow became a sort of career for the white men development and state building theoreticians and analysts while there is a visible absence of Somali voices in the debate. The reason for the absence of forceful Somali voices for the future of their country in development debates were many. However, one notable reason was and still is that Somali Students primarily focus on technical skills for gainful employment and don’t learn the critical courses in Social Science that create the possibility of social transformations. He points out the scarcity of libraries, and seasonal scholars who can act as role models is hampering and impending knowledge production that challenges the dominant orthodox. He call the Somalis youth to set up scholarly and political platforms and own their narrative and destiny.

Chapter 2 is an excerpt from his book Africa’s First Democrats. The author divided the Somali ruling elites before the coup into two camps. He argues that one group had a civic agenda and driven by national interest and democratic values. This group led by the first Somali president, Aden Abdille and his second prime minster Abdirizak H. Hussein, have undertaken serious public sector reforms and organized a clean election that they lost and gracefully accepted its outcome. The other group he called sectarian who have been driven by personal interest and consolidation of power that finally led to the military takeover. Lewis interpreted the contestation of the democratic era as a genealogical contest between the two dominant clans: Darood and Hawiye clans. Professor Samatar rebuked this argument forwarded by the renowned British anthropoglot I. M. Lewis and argued, convincingly, that the contestation of the two groups had nothing to do with genealogy but rather competing visions of two groups for the country.

Chapter 3 provides a historical background of the role of Islam in the precolonial, colonial and post-colonial eras of the country. Historically, the Somali ulama were guardians of the Islamic religion. They were the vanguards of the Somali people’s struggle to preserve their religion and sovereignty. They led the way and started the jihad to resist the colonial aggressors. Notable among these ulema that led armed resistance was Sayyid Mohammed Abdille Hassan and his well-known Darvish movement. After the country gained independence in 1960, SYL-led civilian government leaders, professor Samatar claims, were cognizant of not using Islam as a political tool. The Military dictatorship has taken a hostile posture toward Islam by embracing Socialism and subsequent killing of religious leaders who criticized the family law introduced by the regime in 1975. Somalis hitherto were known to practice tolerant Sufism-tinged Islam. But that peaceful and tolerant Islam that the country was known for ever since Islam came to the shores ofMore than a millennia ago, Somalia was fundamentally altered at the advent of radical Wahhabi-oriented Islam imported from Saudi Arabia after the central state collapsed in 1991. These radical militant Islamists who came to the scene after the collapse had cleverly exploited the governance vacuum and established themselves. The role of Islam in public life is changed overnight into something sinister by the emergence of these radical groups who exploited the religion to attain power.

Professor Samatar touches on the fall and rise of Political Islam in Somalia and the US and western plunder by green lighting the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006 after the moderate Islamic Courts Union chased the notorious warlords from the capital city and much of the southern parts of the country. Ethiopia committed war crimes in Somalia after it invaded the country and got away with it because the West, who encouraged her to invade Somalia in the first place, looked the other way and didn’t want their culpability in the crime to be exposed. He misspells the common perception the West held toward Islam informed by their war on terror and strategic interests.

Chapter 4, Interestingly, he links the piracy problem to state failure debates. He states that the civic and sectarian groups contested in the democratic era, and sectarian groups triumphed, which led to a military coup that eventually facilitated the collapse of the state. The demise of the central Somali state and the ensuing civil war has paved the way for the emergency of many unsavoury players, such as the notorious warlords and Islamist/ terrorist groups that the country is dealing with right now, piracy. He argues that the only effective way to tackle these perennial issues is to rebuild a strong, democratic national government.

Finally, professor Samatar calls to liberate Somali Studies from the dominant school, which is foreign-driven with a little bit of colonial legacy perspective. His take on this is part of his overall criticism of the status quo, whether it is the country's dismal political and social realities as well as the studies of the pressing issues through the lens of the old and stale Somali Studies. He calls a new paradigm to bypass the conventional wisdom that has long constrained fresh thinking and new ideas in the Somali Studies arena.

The current studies of Somali Studies are no longer productive, nor is it adding any meaningful contribution to the debate of how to solve the stubborn and age-old governance problems or otherwise that the country is facing right now. The old barren debate is no longer tenable or useful. According to him, the situation needs a fresh and localized perspective and a new way of thinking and doing things. Professor Samatar emphasizes the importance of re-defining our story in our own terms. It is high time to own our story.

The book is a good read for anyone interested in the debates on Somali Studies. It serves as an Introductory book for Somali Students of social science. It also serves as a repository of hard-earned wisdom from someone who was in the trenches for a long time - for posterity.

Review by: Abdirahman Issa

and Farhan Ashkir